Bernard Suzanne: Nous et noein dans les dialogues de Platon

Un certain nombre de termes dérivés de la racine noos/nous jouent un grand rôle dans les dialogues et en particulier dans les discussions dont on croit pouvoir extraire une « théorie des idées » attribuable à Platon. C'est par exemple le cas de noèton (voir la page consacrée à ce mot), en particulier dans les livres VI et VII de la République, ou encore de dianoia. Cette page donne quelques éléments pour mieux comprendre ce terme, ainsi que le verbe qui en dérive, noein, et ses composés, et retrouver les usages qui en sont faits dans les dialogues.

 

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Lloyd P. Gerson: Some Aspects of Nous and Noesis in Plato

Sometimes scholars of ancient Greek philosophy—perhaps unconsciously—substitute translation for explanation. This is particularly evident in translations of the language of what used to be called higher cognition. We read, for example, that nou'" for Plato is "mind" or "reason" or "intellect" and that the activity in which nou'" engages, namely, novhsi", is "intellection" or "intuition" or "thinking" or "understanding" or "knowing," and so on. One need not quarrel with these translations in order to point out they are just placeholders for a genuine account of Plato's intentions or meaning. This is particularly evident given that the linguistic and conceptual apparatus surrounding the use of such English terms have no clear Platonic application. To take one simple example, in English it is easy to suppose that understanding is often equivalent to cognizing a term or concept where the criterion of "cognizing" is success in their application. For Plato, by contrast, there are very good grounds indeed for thinking that understanding intelligible reality is not equivalent to understanding words or concepts. If that is so, then what is understanding supposed by Plato to be? Similar considerations could be adduced for virtually every English term used to translate nou'" and nohvsi".

In this paper, I want to advance one general and one specific claim. The general claim is that Plato's approach to cognition or, if one likes, to epistemology, is incomprehensible apart from his metaphysics. The specific claim is that Plato has something precise in mind when he is talking about novhsi". To put it emblematically and, I confess, anachronistically, he is talking about the cognition of material identity. In a way, this type of cognition is for Plato the daily bread of philosophy. In addition, as we shall see in a moment, its ubiquity and irreducibility to any other type of cognition is itself a powerful reason supporting of Plato's metaphysics.

I am henceforth going to use the placeholders "intellect" and "intellection" for nou'" and novhsi", respectively. I do this with a certain amount of diffidence and with no other intention than to preserve the etymological connection between the two terms and the terms for their objects, namely, ta; nohtav and ta; noouvmena, or "intelligibles".

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Philippe Soual: L’héroïsme de la liberté chez Descartes

Cet article étudie la conception cartésienne de la liberté, d’abord dans son essence métaphysique, en tant que résolution de l’ego singulier à la liberté éclairée, dans la pensée et dans l’action, et ensuite dans ses conséquences morales et politiques. Il montre que Descartes énonce une conception héroïque de la liberté, en vertu de la noblesse du libre arbitre présent en tout homme, ce qui implique une intériorisation et une universalisation de l’idéal aristocratique, dans une morale de la générosité et de la charité dans l’amitié. Il esquisse à partir de là une politique cartésienne possible, dans la figure de l’individu et dans celle du prince, en tant qu’union des volontés infinies et libres, et en tant que vie qui ouvre aux plus héroïques actions humaines, dans un monde où il s’agit d’être homme de bien.  

This article studies the cartesian conception of freedom, first in its metaphysical essence, as resolution of the singular ego to enlightened freedom, both in thought and in action, and then in its moral and political consequences. It shows that Descartes announces a heroic conception of freedom, by virtue of the nobility of the free will present in all men, which implies an interiorization and a universalization of the aristocratic ideal, in a morality of generosity and charity in friendship. It sketches from there a cartesian policy liable in the person of the individual and in that of the prince, as the union of infinite and free wills, and as the life which opens on the most heroic of human actions, in a world which places importance on being a gentleman.

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