Cosmos and History Edition - The Spirit of the Age: Hegel and the Fate of Thinking

The Spirit of the Age: Hegel and the Fate of Thinking

Table of Contents

No. 2

The Spirit of The Age and the Fate of Philosophical Thinking Abstract PDF HTML
Paul Ashton, Toula Nicolacopoulos, George Vassilacopoulos 1-4
Would Hegel Be A ‘Hegelian’ Today? Abstract PDF HTML
H. S. Harris 5-15
Hegel, Idealism and God: Philosophy as the Self-Correcting Appropriation of the Norms of Life and Thought Abstract PDF HTML
Paul Redding 16-31
Hegel, Derrida and the Subject Abstract PDF HTML
Simon Lumsden 32-50
Hegel’s Science of Logic and the “Sociality of Reason” Abstract PDF HTML
Jorge Armando Reyes 51-83
The Ego as World: Speculative Justification and the Role of the Thinker in Hegel’s Philosophy Abstract PDF HTML
Toula Nicolacopoulos, George Vassilacopoulos 84-116
Hegel Today: Towards a Tragic Conception of Intercultural Conflicts Abstract PDF HTML
Karin G de Boer 117-131
Sein und Geist: Heidegger’s Confrontation with Hegel’s Phenomenology Abstract PDF HTML
Robert Sixto Sinnerbrink 132-152
Hegel, Recognition And Rights: ‘Anerkennung’ As A Gridline Of The Philosophy Of Rights Abstract PDF HTML
Jürgen Lawrenz 153-169
Hegel’s Theory of Moral Action, its Place in his System and the ‘Highest’ Right of the Subject Abstract PDF HTML
David Rose 170-191

No. 3

Being and Implication: On Hegel and the Greeks Abstract PDF HTML
Andrew Haas 192-210
The Relevance of Hegel's Logic Abstract PDF HTML
John W Burbidge 211-221
Agamben, Hegel, and the State of Exception Abstract PDF HTML
Wendell Kisner 222-253
Gathering and Dispersing: The Absolute Spirit in Hegel’s Philosophy Abstract PDF HTML
George Vassilacopoulos 254-275
Hegel and the Becoming of Essence Abstract PDF HTML
David Gray Carlson 276-290
Dialectical Reason and Necessary Conflict—Understanding and the Nature of Terror Abstract PDF HTML
Angelica Nuzzo 291-307
The Spirit (of our Time) is and is not a Bone. Abstract PDF HTML
Johan Vandycke 308-327
The Beginning Before the Beginning: Hegel and the Activation of Philosophy Abstract PDF HTML
Paul Ashton 328-356
Kierkegaard’s Ethical Stage In Hegel’s Logical Categories: Actual Possibility, Reality And Necessity Abstract PDF HTML
María J. Binetti 357-369
El estadio ético de Kierkegaard en las categorías lógicas de Hegel: posibilidad, realidad y necesidad actuales Abstract PDF HTML
María J. Binetti 370-383

Book Reviews

A Preface to a New Era (Yirmiyahu Yovel, Hegel's Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit) Abstract PDF HTML
Mark Hewson 384-388
Recognition or Decentred Agency? Philosophical Culture and its Discontents (Jurist, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche: Philosophy, Culture, and Agency) Abstract PDF HTML
Robert Sixto Sinnerbrink 389-395
A Model of Pedagogy, but is it Hegel? Abstract PDF HTML
Jack William Moloney 396-399
The ‘Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit’—a Brief Review (Stern, Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit) Abstract PDF HTML
Tim Themi 400-404

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Stanford Encyclopedia: Kant and Hume on Morality

The ethics of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is often contrasted with that of David Hume (1711–1776). Hume's method of moral philosophy is experimental and empirical; Kant emphasizes the necessity of grounding morality in a priori principles. Hume says that reason is properly a “slave to the passions,” while Kant bases morality in his conception of a reason that is practical in itself. Hume identifies such feelings as benevolence and generosity as proper moral motivations; Kant sees the motive of duty—a motive that Hume usually views as a second best or fall back motive—as uniquely expressing an agent's commitment to morality and thus as conveying a special moral worth to actions. Although there are many points at which Kant's and Hume's ethics stand in opposition to each other, there are also important connections between the two. Kant shared some important assumptions about morality and motivation with Hume, and had, early in his career, been attracted and influenced by the sentimentalism of Hume and other British moralists.

My aim in this essay is not to compare Hume and Kant on all matters ethical. Instead, I intend to examine several key areas of ethics in which we can reasonably see Kant as responding to or influenced by Hume, or in which comparisons between their theories are particularly interesting. I will have more to say about Kant than Hume. I will include exposition of many of each philosopher's important arguments so that the reader can make comparisons herself.

Hume's main ethical writings are to be found in A Treatise on Human Nature (1739–40), especially books two and three, and in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). Also relevant to Hume's ethics are various essays, such as “Of Suicide” (1777), parts of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), and his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779).

Kant's main works on ethics, narrowly considered, are the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and the Metaphysics of Morals (1797), which contains both “the Doctrine of Right” and “the Doctrine of Virtue.” Other works of importance to Kant's moral philosophy include the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793), and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), in addition to student notes on lectures Kant gave on ethics and various essays on history and political philosophy, such as “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History” (1786) and “Toward Perpetual Peace” (1795).

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Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari - Capitalism: A Very Special Delirium


QUESTION: When you describe capitalism, you say: "There isn't the slightest operation, the slightest industrial or financial mechanism that does not reveal the dementia of he capitalist machine and the pathological character of its rationality (not at all a false rationality, but a true rationality of *this* pathology, of *this madness*, for the machine does work, be sure of it). There is no danger of this machine going mad, it has been mad from the beginning and that's where its rationality comes from. Does this mean that after this "abnormal" society, or outside of it, there can be a "normal" society?

GILLES DELEUZE: We do not use the terms "normal" or "abnormal". All societies are rational and irrational at the same time. They are perforce rational in their mechanisms, their cogs and wheels, their connecting systems, and even by the place they assign to the irrational. Yet all this presupposes codes or axioms which are not the products of chance, but which are not intrinsically rational either. It's like theology: everything about it is rational if you accept sin, immaculate conception, incarnation. Reason is always a region cut out of the irrational -- not sheltered from the irrational at all, but a region traversed by the irrational and defined only by a certain type of relation between irrational factors. Underneath all reason lies delirium, drift. Everything is rational in capitalism, except capital or capitalism itself. The stock market is certainly rational; one can understand it, study it, the capitalists know how to use it, and yet it is completely delirious, it's mad. It is in this sense that we say: the rational is always the rationality of an irrational. Something that hasn't been adequately discussed about Marx's *Capital* is the extent to which he is fascinated by capitalists mechanisms, precisely because the system is demented, yet works very well at the same time. So what is rational in a society? It is -- the interests being defined in the framework of this society -- the way people pursue those interests, their realisation. But down below, there are desires, investments of desire that cannot be confused with the investments of interest, and on which interests depend in their determination and distribution: an enormous flux, all kinds of libidinal-unconscious flows that make up the delirium of this society. The true story is the history of desire. A capitalist, or today's technocrat, does not desire in the same way as a slave merchant or official of the ancient Chinese empire would. That people in a society desire repression, both for others and *for themselves*, that there are always people who want to bug others and who have the opportunity to do so, the "right" to do so, it is this that reveals the problem of a deep link between libidinal desire and the social domain. A "disinterested" love for the oppressive machine: Nietzsche said some beautiful things about this permanent triumph of slaves, on how the embittered, the depressed and the weak, impose their mode of life upon us all.

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Henri Bergson - Introduction à la metaphysique (1903)


Bergson, Henri (1903). Introduction à la metaphysique. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale T. XL.

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Jean Frère: À la naissance du moi

FRERE, Jean. À la naissance du moi. Kriterion, jul./dez. 2007, vol.48, no.116, p.295-306. ISSN 0100-512X.


Abstract
The article analyses some of the moments in the elaboration of the "self", as a foundation of psyche, in ancient culture. Starting from Homer, the author goes through Aeschylus and Sophocles, to arrive at the Socratic moment.

Introduction
Le substrat de nos pensées, de nos désirs et de nos sentiments peut se désigner, en son unité et son originalité, comme notre "moi". Cette instance psychique première est devenue fondamentale dans l'élaboration des problèmes de la connaissance et de l'action, lorsque le retour de soi sur soi est devenu capital (Augustin, Descartes). Mais, dès les premiers temps de la culture grecque, l'intérêt s'est porté sur l'affirmation du moi. Nous retiendrons ici quelques grandes étapes dans l'élaboration de ce fond intérieur du psychisme qu'est le moi. Poésie et philosophie y ont peu à peu contribué. Nous partirons d'Homère et d'Eschyle; puis, après le tournant sophocléen, nous viendrons à l'importance du moment socratique. Le moi -et le toi corrélatif-, c'est le "je" et le "tu" renforcés. Dans la langue grecque le "je" et le "tu" sont intégrés dans la conjugaison du verbe lui-même. Mais, quand l'affirmation du sujet de l'action se trouve réitérée, on rencontre le "moi-je" (ego) et le "toi-tu" (su). C'est spécialement au niveau du dialogue, et dans des moments charnières de celui-ci, qu'à la fois s'exprime nettement et s'affirme la présence originale du moi (ou du toi). Cette présence, au demeurant, évolue significativement d'Homère à Socrate. Alors que chez les personnages d'Homère, d'Eschyle et de Sophocle, le moi se révèle à travers les situations tendues du combat, de la conquête et du tourment, chez Socrate le moi s'affirme par lui-même et se reconnaît dans sa manière réfléchie et critique d'envisager les choses. Passionnel d'Homère à Sophocle, le moi se fait, avec Socrate, moi réfléchissant sur lui-même et sur le monde.

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The Virtual and the Ether: Transcendental Empiricism in Kant's Opus Postumum

link: dundee.ac.uk

Lord, Beth . The Virtual and the Ether: Transcendental Empiricism in Kant's Opus Postumum. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology (forthcoming, 2008)
In this paper I ask to what extent Kant anticipates Deleuze's transcendental empiricism, both in his identification of problems within transcendental idealism, and in his speculative solution to them with the concept of ether. In the first half I set out three motivations for adopting transcendental empiricism as Deleuze formulates it. I then look at Kant's identification of three problems concerning sensation that relate to these motivations. In the second half I suggest that Kant's own solution to his three problems of sensation, the concept of ether, is similar in some respects to Deleuze's virtual. I will argue that in his late work, Kant moves towards transcendental empiricism, but that his retention of the transcendent prevents his fully embracing it.

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Leibniz: Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis (1684)

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Leibniz: Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis. Original text with portuguese translation.

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Mind Papers: A Bibliography of the Philosophy of Mind

link: consc.net/mindpapers


Compiled by David Chalmers.

A [n extensive] bibliography of work in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of cognitive science, and the science of consciousness. It consists of 18395 entries, and is divided into 8 parts, each of which is further divided by topic and subtopic. Both online and offline material is included, with links wherever possible.

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Kant: Sobre el uso de principios teleológicos en la filosofía (1788)

link: 4shared

1. I. Kant, Sobre el uso de principios teleológicos en la filosofía (traducción de Nuria Sánchez Madrid).
2. I. Kant, Trabajo preparatorio de Sobre el uso de principios teleológicos en la filosofía (traducción de Nuria Sánchez Madrid).
3. Introducción de la traductora: Una técnica sin artesano: la teleología dentro de los límites de la mera Razón.

Source: Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Prinzipien in der Philosophie, hrsg. von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, Bd. VIII, 1923, pp.159-184.

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Gustav Fechner: Original edition of 'Elemente der Psychophysik' (1889)

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Two books on BIUM:

FECHNER, Gustav Theodor. Elemente der Psychophysik / vol. 1 Leipzig : Breitkopf und Härtel, 1889.

FECHNER, Gustav Theodor. Elemente der Psychophysik / vol. 2 Leipzig : Breitkopf und Härtel, 1889.

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Kant on Relations and the Selbstsetzungslehre [Self-Positing], by Lubica Učník

link: mic.ul.ie/


In this paper, I outline Kant's attempt to account for the category of relations, which is concomitant with his effort to prove that atomism cannot describe human experience. Kant's journey from the First Critique to his last work the Opus Postumum is a struggle against atomistic versions of the world. In the last instance, it is a transit from I think to I act; and it is also recognition that to act can only be performed in a relational manner in community with others. In order to substantiate his explanation of real forces in the world, Kant rethinks and extends his understanding of the subject from the subject as the unity of apperception to the self-positing subject living in the world with others. In order to defend 'the being in the world' who 'has rights,' I argue that we need to return to Kant's general account of rights for all humans in the world.

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Lorem Ipsum

"All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments; no it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which our arguments have their life."
- Wittgenstein

Lorem Ipsum

"Le poète ne retient pas ce qu’il découvre ; l’ayant transcrit, le perd bientôt. En cela réside sa nouveauté, son infini et son péril"

René Char, La Bibliothèque est en feu (1956)


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