If universities sacrifice philosophy on the altar of profit, what’s next?

Julian Baggini on Guardian:

You might think that a university philosophy department facing closure in Hull is of as much interest to the average person as the shutting of a butcher’s in Wolverhampton is to a vegetarian in Totnes. There are almost as many universities as high streets now, and for every closure here there’s an opening somewhere else.

But the events unfolding on Humberside are symptomatic of a deep malaise affecting not just universities but the wider culture. The crude pursuit of what is “practical”, “efficient” or “useful” is threatening everything of value that isn’t evidently profitable.

There is a current state of art concerning something like a separation of "knowledge" and "practice". The author of this article uses this separation to try to legitimize Philosophy despite of the "pratical" values of another subjects.

But, despite of the charge that Philosophy would have no use in face of a utilitarian world, the author invests in the fact that Philosophy would have a kind of "inherent value" and the philosopher can "choose" for not being utilitarian.

This seems to be a mistake, cause of Philosophy is, in front of the applied sciences, the same as Physics, Mathematics, or Statistics.

For example, the physicist has subjects and tasks much broader than that ones of engineering, but a physicist working with engineers, or an engineer with formation in physics can make a big difference. The same is true if one thinks of a physicist, a mathematician, or even an engineer that's a good calculator, doing "applied" tasks in economy or administration: there is much more extensive expertise and rigor than in the standard "technical" skills in economy or administration.

The same thing happens in Philosophy. The conceptual analysis, the rigor and the analysis of texts, all of these competences exceed that ones of the "applied" sciences. Even the philosophical subjects are much broader and not restricted to "applied" affairs. 

Even the XIX's universities, which made philosophy a kind of an academic discipline, knew of this strategic role. 

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"Clichés, frases feitas, adesão a códigos de expressão e conduta convencionais e padronizados têm a função socialmente reconhecida de proteger-nos da realidade, ou seja, da exigência de atenção do pensamento feita por todos os fatos e acontecimentos em virtude de sua mera existência" 

- Hannah Arendt (pesquisa de livros)

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Chagas: O Pensamento de Marx sobre a Subjetividade

O pensamento de Karl Marx sobre a subjetividade humana é pouco conhecido e divulgado na língua portuguesa, e, no Brasil, particularmente, carece ainda de um estudo amplo, explícito e sistemático. Meu artigo pretende esboçar uma reflexão mais completa de sua filosofia sobre a subjetividade humana, insistindo não somente na crítica, mas também, e especialmente, na compreensão da referida questão, a partir de uma leitura imanente e estrutural de suas obras, no original. Vale ainda ressaltar que minha investigação se apoia na conexão entre subjetividade e objetividade, entre sujeito e objeto, inquirindo se há um determinismo da objetividade sobre a subjetividade, ou seja, se essas duas determinações são contraditórias no interior do pensamento marxiano, comprometendo, pois, as suas reflexões acerca da crítica à filosofia especulativa de Hegel e ao empirismo da economia clássica, ou se, na verdade, tal conexão é o segredo recôndito de sua filosofia sobre a subjetividade humana.

(Fonte: Trans/Form/Ação v. 36 n. 2 (2013) - pesquisa de livros sobre Marx)

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Husserl - Intuition, categorial object and categorial intuition

Intuition:

An intuition is an act characterized by intuitive fullness, that is, by the presence of presenting contents or representing contents in the act. While Husserl abandoned the early doctrine of representing contents, it remains the case for him that intuitions are characterized by the presence of sensuous content, that is, that intuitive acts are perceptions or modifications of perception. It is in this sense that intuitions present an object in its “bodily givenness” and that they serve as evidence. For example, a name expressing the empty intention of an object is fulfilled in the perceptual intuition of the named object precisely as named. Similarly, a declarative sentence expressing a judgment is fulfilled in an intuition that is the modification of a perception, namely a categorial intuition, that “bodily” presents the state of affairs as judged.

Categorial object

A categorial object is one infused with form or structure. Examples of categorial objects are states of affairs, groups, relations, numbers, or any object in which parts have been articulated. The articulated whole, in which the parts are both distinguished and joined together, is the categorial object. The categorial object can be intended in an empty signitive intention or in a categorial intuition, and the categorial object is the identity given in this manifold of absent and present modes. Early in his career—up through the Logical Investigations—Husserl understood the distinction between non-categorial and categorial objects and that between pre-predicative and predicative experiences as correlates, but he came to recognize that even pre-predicative experience has a kind of categoriality proper to it. This pre-predicative categoriality is not yet fully articulated, but it nevertheless adds a moment of form to what is experienced. The adumbrational character of perception means that the object is experienced as something or other; perception is categorially structured in an anticipatory manner by the hermeneutic-as (p. 51)

Categorial intuition:

A categorial intuition is the fulfilling act for an empty, signitive intention of a categorial object. Categorial intuition directly presents the unity of whole and part, of the members of a group, of the terms of a relation, and so forth. Categorial intuition is a modification of perception, insofar as the subject sees, for example, not merely “the red door” but “that the door is red.” The formal or categorial moment of the categorial object is not the correlate of a perceptual moment in the fulfilling act insofar as the categorial intuition is not directed simply to the concrete object or to any of its abstract perceptible qualities. Instead, categorial intuitions, as do all categorial acts, involve a moment of thinking that moves beyond its perceptual foundations. Categorial intuition is a “thoughtful perception” that does not merely add thoughtfulness to perception but unifies what is directly encountered in and of an object that is at once perceived (or remembered or imagined) and thoughtfully articulated. (p. 50)

John Drummond: Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy (Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies and Movements) The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2007

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“Um homem não entra no panteão dos filósofos por ter se aplicado a ter apenas ideias eternas, e o tom de verdade só vibra por muito tempo quando o autor interpela a sua vida.” 

Merleau-Ponty

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Histoire de la Folie on France Culture

En 1961, Foucault soutient sa thèse intitulée "Histoire de la folie". Objet de nombreuses critiques, elle n'est pas tant une histoire de la psychiatrie que celle des pratiques adoptées du Moyen Âge à Freud. Qu'est-ce qui a rendu possible la constitution de la folie comme objet de connaissance ?

source: Entretien avec Luca Paltrinieri et faits divers.

Dans l’"Histoire de la folie", en 1961, Foucault parle précisément de la maladie mentale, une sorte de confiscation d’une expérience par ce qu’il appelle le pouvoir médical. Mais en quoi consiste le pouvoir médical ? Dans l’établissement d’une sorte d’objectivation du fou qui finalement conduit à une impossibilité de dialogue entre le normal et le fou. C’est peut-être exactement ce dialogue que Foucault cherche à décrire dans son "Histoire de la folie". Quel est le dialogue qu’il y a eu entre la normalité et la folie ? Entre la raison et la déraison ?

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Kant on Empirical Psychology and Experimentation (Michael Bennett McNulty)

Michael Bennett McNulty (2018). Kant on Empirical Psychology and Experimentation. In Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing, David Wagner (Eds.), Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (pp. 2707–2714). Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110467888-270

Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110467888
More books on Kant

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Kant on Chemistry and the Application of Mathematics in Natural Scienc (Michael Bennett McNulty)

In his Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, Kant claims that chemistry is a science, but not a proper science (like physics), because it does not adequately allow for the application of mathematics to its objects. This paper argues that the application of mathematics to a proper science is best thought of as depending upon a coordination between mathematically constructible concepts and those of the science. In physics, the proper science that exhausts the a priori knowledge of objects of the outer sense, only motions and concepts reducible to motions can be legitimately coordinated with mathematical constructions. Since chemistry can neither achieve its own a priori principles of coordination nor be reduced to the coordinated doctrine of motion, it is a merely improper science.

(source: Kantian Review) (more books on Kant)

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A Psicologia entre o longo passado e a curta história

This paper intends to insert the History of Psychology in a wider debate along with the History of Philosophy and History of Science. In order to do that, the object of analysis is Hermann Ebbinghaus’s famous phrase, ‘Psychology has an old past, but a short history’, and all the tradition of books and textbooks due to it, very popular on the 20th and 21st centuries. The paper is going to analyse Ebbinghaus’s text and its historical commitments and consequences. Then will perform a critics of this tradition, in 3 fronts of arguments: firstly, bringing up some more recent studies on Gustav Fechner, seen as a central character on the making of Psychology as a science, but nevertheless ignored for its ‘speculative’ commitments. Secondly, the paper will confront such questions with the historical perspectives of 20th century, specially the epistemological history of science. Finally, the paper will open the argument of ‘old past’ to a more wide ‘history’, showing contemporary analysts who started to scan the historical meaning of the word ‘Psychology’

O presente trabalho pretende inserir a História da Psicologia dentro de um debate mais alargado, em torno das Histórias da Filosofia e das Ciências. Para isso, o objeto de análise a célebre frase de Ebbinghaus, ‘A Psicologia tem um longo passado, mas uma curta história’, e toda a tradição de livros e textbooks decorrente dela, muito popular nos séculos XX e XXI. O trabalho analisará o texto de Ebbinghaus e seus compromissos decorrentes. Então realizará uma crítica a essa tradição, em três frentes: primeiramente, trazendo à tona estudos mais recentes sobre Gustav Fechner, encarado como figura central na constituição da Psicologia como ciência, mas não obstante ignorado por seus compromissos 'especulativos’; em segundo lugar, confrontando tais questões com as perspectivas do século XX, especialmente a história epistemológica das ciências; finalmente, abrindo o 'longo passado’ a uma história mais alargada, a partir de analistas mais contemporâneos que começaram a perscrutar o próprio termo 'Psicologia’.

(Source: philpapers.org - Pesquisa de livros sobre Psicologia)

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uma tradução

Certa vez eu dava aula em um curso de Humanas e me deparei com uma tradução mal feita. O assunto, importante naquela área, continha poucos títulos em português do autor principal. O autor era alemão, mas muitas das poucas traduções em português eram vertidas do inglês.

Aquela, em especial, além de ser mal traduzida do inglês, não verificou o próprio original em alemão. O original em alemão continha 65 páginas, e a versão em inglês umas vinte e poucas. Além disso, a própria tradução do inglês continha palavras erradas e omissão de trechos. Boa parte do artigo não havia sido traduzido, e a parte traduzida também omitia partes importantes, às vezes simplesmente cortando frases e adulterando o contexto.

Mas aquele texto famoso era o único disponível da espécie em português.

Então fui conversar com um colega, apontando os erros e mostrando meu espanto sobre como um texto tão importante poderia ter tantos problemas.

A resposta me surpreendeu mais ainda do que o texto. O colega me disse que aquele era um curso de graduação, e que tais coisas deveriam ser tratadas na pós. Disse, ainda, que esse tipo de tom era de quem insistiria em mudar coisas na graduação, quando o espaço para mudanças não era ali, e sim na pós. Também disse que "essas coisas de filósofo" mostram claramente o tipo de profissional que se aventura em áreas alheias.

O original em alemão permanece intocável.

(fonte da foto)

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Michel Foucault, Entretien avec Roger-Pol Droit (1975, inédit)

Inédit extrait d'une série d'entretiens que Roger-Pol Droit a eus avec Michel Foucault au mois de juin 1975, quelques semaines après la publication de « Surveiller et punir ». Le Point 01/07/04 - N°1659 p.82

Roger-Pol Droit : Vous n'aimez pas qu'on vous demande qui vous êtes, vous l'avez dit souvent. Je vais quand même essayer. Souhaitez-vous qu'on vous nomme historien ? 

Michel Foucault : Je suis très intéressé par le travail que font les historiens, mais je veux en faire un autre.

Doit-on vous appeler philosophe ?

Pas non plus. Ce que je fais n'est aucunement une philosophie. Ce n'est pas non plus une science à laquelle on pourrait demander les justifications ou les démonstrations qu'on est en droit de demander à une science.

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