James et Husserl : Perception des formes et polarisation des flux de conscience

Recommandée par Carl Stumpf, la lecture des Principles of psychology de William James au début des années 1890 fit, on le sait, très forte impression sur le jeune Edmund Husserl. Après avoir publié sa Philosophie de l’arithmétique, issue de la thèse de doctorat qu’avait dirigée Stumpf, Husserl s’était en effet lancé dans des recherches psychologiques pour préparer des cours, mais aussi et surtout pour investiguer dans le détail les rapports du logique au sens large avec la psychologie, et singulièrement avec la psychologie descriptive héritée de Franz Brentano. Ce travail, rendu nécessaire par certaines difficultés rencontrées sur le terrain de la philosophie des mathématiques, allait finalement mener Husserl sur le chemin de l’élaboration de la phénoménologie, d’abord dans les Recherches logiques de 1900-1901, puis, une fois effectué le « tournant transcendantal » aux alentours de 1906-1907, dans les Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie de 1913.

Leclerq B, Galetic S, « James et Husserl : Perception des formes et polarisation des flux de conscience », Revue internationale de philosophie, 2012/2 (n° 260), p. 229-250. URL : https://www.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-philosophie-2012-2-page-229.htm

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Les paroles de Deleuze

Voici "l'ensemble des 413h de cours de Gilles Deleuze, y compris trois séances encore jamais mises en ligne".

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Husserl’s incomplete revisions of the Sixth Investigation

In 1913 Husserl intended to revise the Sixth Investigation in a radical fashion, but became bogged down (see his letter of 23 June 1913 to Daubert, quoted in Hua XIX/1: xxv), and eventually withheld it when he sent the revised five Investigations to press. Husserl now recognised that his original account of categorial intuition with its realist commitments did not fit comfortably with his new transcendental idealist framework. He made various attempts at a complete reworking of this Investigation in late 1913 and again in 1914, but lost enthusiasm for these revisions during the war years (1914–18), when exhaustion prevented research ‘on behalf of the phenomenology of logic’ ( für die Phänomenologie des Logischen, Findlay II: 177; Hua XIX/2: 533). As he recounted, he could only ‘bear the war and the ensuing “peace”’ by engaging in more general philosophical reflections, specifically the elaboration of his ‘Idea of a phenomenological philosophy’ (Idee einer phänomenologsiche Philosophie, Findlay II: 177; Hua XIX/2: 533). Meanwhile, he gave the manuscripts to Edith Stein who attempted to order them into two articles for the Jahrbuch, but she could not get Husserl to look over her work and the project stalled.

After the war, Husserl turned again to logic and eventually was prevailed upon to publish a limited revision of the Sixth Investigation in spring 1921. In his Foreword, dated Freiburg, October 1920, Husserl regrets that he was unable to produce the radically revised Sixth Investigation promised in 1913, and acknowledges that it was the pressure of friends (including, presumably, his new assistant, Martin Heidegger) that finally forced him to produce this new edition. In fact, Husserl was never satisfied with his revision and continued to work intermittently on a full revision of this crucial Investigation,leaving some drafts that remained unpublished at his death.50 These drafts attempt a complete rethinking of the nature of signs involving a distinction between signitive and significative intentions in attempting to specify the achievement of abstract symbolic thought.51 Husserl was also gradually coming to recognise the contextual aspect of meaning which would lead eventually to his discovery of ‘genetic’ phenomenology in the early 1920s.

In Husserl, E. The Shorter Logical Investigations (Introduction). Routledge, p. XLIII-XLIV.

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Wehrle: ‘There is a Crack in Everything’. Fragile Normality: Husserl’s Account of Normality Re-visited

There is paradox that lies at the heart of every investigation of normality, namely, its dependence on its other (e.g., deviation, break, difference). In this paper, I want to show that this paradox is the reason for the dynamism as well as fragility of normality. In this regard, I will not only argue that every normality is fragile, but also that normality can only be established because it is fragile. In the first part of this paper, I will present and re-visit Husserl’s account of normality as concordant and optimal with regard to its dynamic or fragile aspects. In the second part of this paper, I will apply this account to recent findings in phenomenological pathology regarding schizophrenia and depression to show how Husserl’s account could be helpful for differentiating between different aspects (such as concordance and optimality) as well as genetic levels of (disturbances of) normality.

WEHRLE, Maren. ‘There is a Crack in Everything’. Fragile Normality: Husserl’s Account of Normality Re-visited. Phainomenon, [S.l.], n. 28, p. 49-76, feb. 2019. ISSN 2183-0142. Available at: http://phainomenon-journal.pt/index.php/phainomenon/article/view/373

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Libération: "Nous, qui au Brésil voyons la démocratie mourir…"

L’avènement d’un régime néolibéral et ultra-autoritaire au Brésil doit servir d’avertissement : Français, l’heure ne peut plus être à la division des forces progressistes.

- Libération

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Vincent Van Gogh Visits the Gallery (Doctor Who)

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Michel Foucault: A Pesquisa Científica e a Psicologia (1957)

In: Espaço Michel Foucault (2010)

As múltiplas psicologias que pretendem descrever o homem dão a impressão de ser tentativas desordenadas. Elas pretendem se construir a partir das estruturas biológicas e reduzem seu objeto de estudo ao corpo ou o deduzem das funções orgânicas; a pesquisa psicológica não é mais que um ramo da fisiologia (ou de um domínio dela): a reflexologia. Ou então elas são reflexivas, introspectivas, fenomenológicas e o homem é puro espírito. Elas estudam as diversidades humanas e descrevem a evolução da criança, as degradações do louco, a estranheza dos primitivos. Ora elas descrevem o elemento, ora pretendem compreender o todo. Às vezes se ocupam exclusivamente com a forma objetiva do comportamento, outras vezes vinculam as ações à vida interior para explicar as condutas, ou ainda pretendem apreender a existência vivida. Algumas deduzem, outras são puramente experimentais e utilizam estruturas matemáticas como forma descritiva. As psicologias diurnas querem explicar a razão da vida do espírito pelos clarões decisivos da inteligência, enquanto as outras visam as inquietantes profundezas da obscuridade interior. Naturalistas, elas traçam os contornos definitivos do homem; humanistas, reconhecem nele algo de inexplicável. Esta complexidade é, talvez, justamente a nossa. Pobre alma (as psicologias que hesitam sobre seus conceitos não sabem sequer nomeá-la), cercada de técnicas, remexida de questões, posta em formulários, traduzida em curvas. Auguste Comte acreditava, com algumas reservas, que a psicologia era uma ciência ilusória, impossível e a menosprezou. Não somos tão ousados. Apesar de tudo, há psicólogos, e que pesquisam.

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